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I. PRELUDE
A. Setting the Stage
We wrote earlier about the U.S. Supreme Court's increased attention
to patent cases from the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.' In
2006, Judge Arthur Gajarsa and Dr. Lawrence Cogswell asked whether
the Supreme Court had truly begun taking an increased patent caseload
or if it just appeared that way. 2 By 2014, the Supreme Court had granted
certiorari on enough Federal Circuit patent cases to confirm that the
upswing is real. In this Article, we review the Supreme Court's interest
in 35 U.S.C. § 101 leading up to the recent impact that interest has had
on patent eligibility jurisprudence and the Federal Circuit.
We start with the applicable statute, 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2013):
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the
conditions and requirements of this title." 3 The statute uses broad
categories to define patent eligible subject matter and modifies those
categories with the unlimited "any." '4 Indeed, § 101 does not list any
patent ineligiblecategories, and neither do the other sections within Title
35.5 Moreover, the categories that are listed provide an expansive
6
threshold subject to "the conditions and requirements of 9this title,"
8
namely novelty,7 non-obviousness, and adequate disclosure.
Following the statute's lead, we differentiate between (i) the patent
eligibility requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 101, and (ii) the remaining
patentability requirements under Title 35, including §§ 102, 103, and 112.
To maintain clarity, we also use the terms "patent eligibility" and the like
with respect to § 101, and the terms "patentability," "unpatentable," and
1. John W. Cox & Joseph L. Vandegrifi, The Supreme Court is PayingAttention to Patent
Law Again, LAW360 (Apr. 1, 2013, 11:54 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/425426/.
2. Arthur J.Gajarsa & Lawrence P. Cogswell, II1, The FederalCircuitand the Supreme
Court,55 AM. U. L. REV. 821, 821-22 (2006).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2013).
4. Id.
5. Patents Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-390 (2013).
6. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2013).
7. Id.§ 102.
8. Id.§ 103.
9. Id.§ 112; seealso Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 602 (2010).
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the like with respect to the other requirements of Title 35.
B. The Constitutionaland Statutory Origins of PatentEligibility
The Constitution provides the basis for the U.S. patent laws.
Specifically, Article I, Section 8 provides that "[t]he Congress shall have
Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries."' 0 Under the influence of
Thomas Jefferson," Congress enacted the first patent laws with the
Patent Act of 1790.12 In doing so, it defined the subject matter of a U.S.
patent as "any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine,
or device, or any
13
improvement therein not before known or used[.],'
Congress has rarely amended the patent statute and even more rarely
changed the provisions related to patent eligibility. 14 The most recent
changes were in 1952 and did nothing to change patent eligibility beyond
changing the term "art" to "process."' 15 The few changes made before
1952 merely clarified the language found in the seminal texts from the
late 1700s.16 In sum, 35 U.S.C. § 101 today remains true to the original
statute.
The Supreme Court has made clear that § 101 broadly covers "any"
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
and recognized that Congress intended its "wide scope" to liberally
encourage innovation. 17 That said, the Court has recognized three specific
and narrow exceptions: (i) laws of nature, (ii) physical or natural
phenomena, and (iii) abstract ideas.' 8 The Supreme Court has carved out
these limited exceptions to the broadly-stated categories of patent eligible
subject matter.
Recently the Supreme Court has interpreted these exceptions to
greatly restrict § 101.19 Interestingly, the Federal Circuit may be

10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
8.
11. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980).
12. Patent Act of 1790 Ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109-112 (amended 1793).
13. Id.§1.
14. See infra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
15. Compare 1790 Patent Act § 1, with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952); see also Ultramercial, Inc.
v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013) ("[Clhanges were made to the 1952 Act to
broaden eligible subject matter and eliminatedoubt caused by narrow interpretations given to the
prior statute.").
16. Compare 1790 Patent Act § 1, with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952).
17. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1980); see also Bilski v. Kappos,
561 U.S. 593, 601 (2010).

18.

See Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 309; see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 601-02.

19.

See infra Part IV.
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beginning to follow suit.20 These shifts are in stark contrast to the fact
that Congress has left mostly untouched the scope of patent eligible
subject matter. E1 Indeed, "when Congress [has] considered § 101, it [has]
broadened the statute and certainly [has] not place[d] any specific limits
on it." 22 This Article shows that despite the constant nature of the statute,
the higher courts have recently had difficulty with patent eligibility.
II. ACT I: THE FIRST CASES
A. Le Roy v. Tatham

One of the first cases in which the Supreme Court dealt with patent
eligibility was the 1852 case Le Roy v. Tatham.23 The patentee had
discovered a new property of lead alloy used in pipe. 24 The Court
reasoned that by itself, the discovery was of merely "[a] principle,
[which,] in the abstract, is a fundamental truth;
an original cause; a
25 and was therefore not patent eligible. 26
motive;
The patentee also had described an improvement to a machine that
applied the newly discovered principle. 27 The Court noted that the result
was a new manufacture and therefore patent eligible under the statute; it
does not matter that the end result may not be novel, as long as the process
for producing that result is novel.28 Thus, the Supreme Court created the
first exception to patent eligibility: a principle
is not patent eligible, yet
29
an application of such a principle could be.
Perhaps foreshadowing the current disagreement between various
members of the judiciary, Justices Nelson, Wayne, and Grier dissented,
arguing that the "new" property should also be patent eligible, as the
30
machinery and apparatus would be useless without the knowledge of it.

The dissent also showed that the confusion between patent eligibility and
20. See infra Part IV.
21. Compare 1790 Patent Act § 1, with 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2013).
22. Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
23. LeRoy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. 156 (1852); see Efthimios Parasidis,A Uniform Framework
for PatentEligibility, 85 TUL. L. REV. 323, 335 (2010).
24. LeRoy, 55 U.S. at 167.

25. Id. at 175.
26. Id.
27.

Id. at 172.

28. Id. at 174-75 (noting with approval the lower court's reasoning that, "even if the mere
combination of machinery in the abstract is not new..., if used and applied in connection with
the practicaldevelopment of a principle, newly discovered, producing a new and useful result,
the subject is patentable [i.e., patent eligible]" (emphasis added)); see also, e.g., Ass'n for
Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013) [hereinafter Myriad V.
29. LeRoy, 55 U.S. at 175.
30. Id. at 179-82 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
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31
patentability has existed since the very beginning.

B. O'Reilly v. Morse
In 0 'Reilly v. Morse, the Court grounded much of its decision in the
Patent Act itself.32 It specifically noted that the Act entitled any person
who "discovered or invented a new and useful art, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter" to a patent.33 While the patent at issue in Morse
contained multiple claims, the Court focused on Claim 8, which covered
"an effect produced by the use of electro-magnetism distinct from the
34
process or machinery necessary to produce it."
The Court held that Claim 8 essentially claimed a monopoly over the
principle of electro-magnetism itself.35 In essence, the claim was too
36
broad because it would have pre-empted any use of electro-magnetism.
The Court reiterated its reasoning from Le Roy that the discovery of a
principle (i.e., natural phenomenon) is not patent eligible. 37 The Court
also stated that a patentee may
only claim otherwise-patentable
38
principle.
a
such
of
applications
Justice Grier, again with Justices Wayne and Nelson, dissented,
arguing that Claim 8 was not too broad and that the majority's use of the
term "broad" was not a valid reason for deeming a particular claim patentineligible. 39 Specifically, he argued that it "is only when [a patentee]
claims something before known and used, something as new which is not
new, either by mistake or intentionally, that his patent is affected., 40 The
dissent again 4confused
patent eligibility with the other requirements for
1
patentability.
C. Tilghman v. Proctor
In the decades that followed Morse, lower courts struggled to
42
determine whether any method or process claims were patent eligible.
The Supreme Court finally clarified the issue in 1880, in Tilghman v.
Proctor, where the patentee had claimed the manufacturing process of
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 181-82.
O'Reilly v. Morse, 56 U.S. 62 (1853).
Id. at 119.
Id. at 86, 120.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 112-13.
Id. at 116.
Id. at 101-02.
Id. at 129-36 (Grier, J., dissenting).
Id. at 135.
See supra Part I.A.
See, e.g., Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707, 725-26 (1880).
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certain chemical compositions that were practiced by the 43defendant using
an apparatus different than the one used by the patentee.
Affirming and applying Morse, the Tilghman Court held the
defendants infringed upon, what the Court found to be, a patent-eligible
process. 44 Specifically, the Court reasoned that "[w]hoever discovers that
a certain useful result will be produced in any art by the use of certain
45
means is entitled to a patent for it, provided he specifies the means."
The Court framed the scientific principle (i.e., natural phenomenon)
exception to the Patent Act by focusing on the enablement provided by
the specification. 46 Specifically, the Court found that "the claim of the
patent is not for a mere principle. . . .Th[e] chemical fact was not
discovered by Tilghman. He only claims to have invented a particular
mode of bringing about the desired chemical
union... He does not claim
47
result.,
this
accomplishing
of
every mode
In other words, the claims did not preempt the principle underlying
the invention, but only a specific process of utilizing it.48 While the claims
satisfied the statutory provisions necessary for patentability, the Court's
focus on preemption would remain a factor in its patent eligibility
calculus.
D. American Fruit Growers v. Brogdex
The Court waited fifty years before substantively revisiting patent
eligibility in American FruitGrowers v. Brogdex.49 In doing so, the Court
expanded upon the natural phenomenon exception first discussed in Le
Roy. 50 Starting with the statute, the Court questioned whether or not an
orange dipped in a borax solution to prevent mold was a "manufacture. "51
Relying upon a dictionary definition from a tariff case, the Court
43. Id. at 720-22. Before the statute expressly included the term "process," the Court held
"there can be no doubt" that a patent can be "granted to a process.... A process eo nomine is not
made the subject of a patent in our act of Congress. It is included under the general term, 'useful
art."' Id at 722.
44. Id. at 734.
45. Id. at 728 (emphasis added).
46. Id.at 728-29.
47. Id.at 729.
48. Later Supreme Court cases would focus more on the idea first discussed in Tilghman
that a process must result in a transformation of an article to a "different state or thing," and form
the foundation of the "machine or transformation" test discussed in Benson, Bilski, Diehr, Flook.
See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 70 (1972); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 560 U.S. 593, 604
(2010); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 184 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 588 n.9
(1978).
49. Compare Am. Fruit Growers v. Brogdex Co., 283 U.S. 1 (193 1), with Tilghman, 102
U.S. at 707 (decided in 1880).
50. See supra Part II.A.
51. Am. Fruit Growers, 283 U.S. at 11.
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determined that a manufacture is the result of "the production of articles
for use from raw or prepared materials by giving
[those] materials new
' 52
forms, qualities, properties, or combinations[.]
The Court found that the claimed oranges did not contain any of these
indicators, despite their coating and new mold resistance.53 Expanding on
the dictionary definition, the Court further stated that there must be some
54
sort of transformation of the natural object to reach patent eligibility.
The Court concluded no such transformation occurred pursuant to the
claims and, as a result, held that the claims did not cover patent eligible
subject matter.55
American Fruit Growers demonstrates confusion by the majority at
the Supreme Court in patent eligibility cases, indeed recognized as
"simply erroneous as a matter of fact.",56 The reasoning applied to reach
the incorrect conclusion-that the patented invention was not an article
of manufacture-is startling. Instead of recognizing that the claims
covered an article of manufacture, namely a borax covered fruit, the
Court separated the components of the "orange, the rind of which has
become impregnated with borax," into "the added substance" (i.e., the
borax) and "the natural article" (i.e., the orange).57 As a result, the Court
could conclude that "[t]here is no change in the name, appearance, or
general character of the fruit. It remains a fresh orange, fit only for the
same beneficial uses as theretofore. 58
But the claims were not directed to "a fresh orange," regardless of its
use; they covered a borax-covered orange, which is not a "natural
article." 59 The Court's holding is incomprehensible unless the
determination concerned novelty under § 102, as opposed to patent
eligibility under § 101.60 The fact that such claims cover patent eligible
subject matter has no bearing on their patentability. Indeed, the Court
found that the claims failed to satisfy the novelty requirement.6 '
E. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co. v. Radio Corp. of America
The Mackay Radio case introduced the mathematical formula
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 11-12.

54.

Id. at 13.

55.

Id. at 12-14.
1-1 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 1.02[3][a] (Matthew Bender & Co.,
Inc. 2014) (1978) ("It must be concluded that the American Fruit Growers treatment of the
meaning of'manufacture' is of little or no precedential value").
56.

57.

Am. Fruit Growers, 283 U.S. at 11.

58. Id. at 12.
59. See id at 11-12.
60. Compare35 U.S.C. § 101, with 35 U.S.C. § 102.
61. Am. FruitGrowers, 283 U.S. at 13-14 (finding that the claims lacked novelty).
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exception to the patent eligibility calculus. 62 The patent applicant sought
claims to an antenna system requiring determinations made via the
application of a mathematical formula. 63 The Court's relevant reasoning
followed the rule that "[a]n idea of itself is not patentable." 64 Justice
Stone explained, "[w]hile a scientific truth, or the mathematical
expression of it, is not patentable invention, a novel and useful structure
created with the aid of knowledge of scientific truth may be."65 Despite
explaining that the application of a mathematical formula may be patent
eligible, while the formula itself
is not, the Court ended its inquiry upon
66
infringement.
of
lack
a
finding
F. Funk Bros. v. Kalo
The Court attempted to cement the natural phenomenon exception
seventeen years later in Funk Brothers v. Kalo.6 7 The claims covered the
mixing of various non-inhibiting bacteria to form a mixture with
improved functional properties. The Court found that the claims
covered patent ineligible subject matter because the patentee had merely
discovered a useful, natural phenomenon:
For patents cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of
nature. The qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun,
electricity, or the qualities of metals, are part of the storehouse of
knowledge of all men. They are manifestations of laws of nature,
free to all men and reserved exclusively to none. He who discovers
a hitherto unknown phenomenon of nature
has no claim to a
69
monopoly of it which the law recognizes.
Specifically, the Court held that the discovery that certain claimed
bacteria can be mixed without reducing their function is "a discovery of
their qualities . . . It is no more than the discovery of some of the
handiwork of nature and hence is not patentable. 70
Interestingly, the Court explained that a patent's utility was irrelevant
to the natural phenomenon exception, stating that "a product must be
62.

Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86, 94 (1939).

63.
64.

Id at 91-92.
Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. 498, 507 (1874) (recognizing that "[an idea

of itself is not patentable, but a new device by which it may be made practically useful is"

(emphasis added)); see also Le Roy v. Tatham, 55 U.S. at 175 ("[A] principle is not patentable.").
65.

Mackay Radio, 306 U.S. at 94 (emphasis added).

66. Id. at 101.
67. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
68. Id. at 130.
69. Id. (citation omitted).
70.

Id. at 131.

2014]

A BRIEFHISTORYOF SUPREME COURTINTERESTIN PATENT-ELIGIBLE SUBJECT MATTER

189

more than new and useful to be patented; it must also satisfy the
requirements of invention or discovery."'" In view of such reasoning, it
has been said that Funk Brothers "is perhaps best viewed as an
interpretation of the nonobviousness or 'invention'
requirement, and not
72
of the statutory classes of subject matter."
Justice Frankfurter concurred with the Court's opinion, expressing
concern that the use of a term like "laws of nature" is too vague to be
useful to lower courts.73 He might not be surprised by the confusion
caused by the Court's expansion of these exceptions. 74 That said, Justice
Frankfurter merely argued that the claimed mixture might be patentable,
but only if the combination produced some new and useful characteristic
or feature.75
Similar to Justice Grier in Morse, Justices Burton and Jackson
dissented and argued that the patentee had made a patent eligible
discovery, at least in part because that discovery was highly useful. 76 Also
like Justice Grier in Morse, their reasoning conflates a patentability
requirement, in this case novelty, with patent eligibility. 77
III. ACT II: THE NEXT GENERATION-FROM THE 1952 PATENT ACT
TO THE CREATION OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

A. Gottschalk v. Benson
After the passage of the 1952 Patent Act, the Supreme Court went two
decades 78before hearing its next patent eligibility case, Gottschalk
v.
Benson, an opinion described as "confusing and illogical. 79 Indeed, the
Federal Circuit's predecessor court later "struggled with the ambiguities

71. Id.
72. CI-usuM, supra note 56, § 1.02[7][b], at 1-60; see also Matthew W. Siegal & Etan
Chatlynne, In Myriad, Did Supreme Court Confuse Its Own Precedent?,LAw360 (Aug. 5, 2013,
1:43 PM), www.law360.com/articles/459177 ("Insofar as the 'invention' analysis did not include
a citation to a patent eligibility case, it seems unlikely that the court based its holding on patentineligibility grounds ....

Nonetheless ....

the Supreme Court has consistently treated Funk

Brothers as a patent-eligibility case[.]").
73. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 134-35 (1948) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
74.

See infra Part IV.

75. FunkBros., 333 U.S. at 135 (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
76. Id.at 136-38 (Burton, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
79. CHisuM, supra note 56, § 1.03[6][c], at 1-196.
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' 80
in the Supreme Court's holding and rationale in Benson."
In Benson, the patentee claimed a process for converting binary code
in decimal form to pure binary numbers. 8 1 After reviewing many of the
cases discussed in Part II, the Court began its analysis with the foundation
that the "[t]ransformation and reduction of an article 'to a different state
or thing' is 82
the clue... of a process claim that does not include particular
machines."
Despite the Court's focus on the historical predecessor to the machine
or transformation test, the Court stated that there might be processes that
qualify as patent eligible, regardless of not being linked to a particular
83
machine or not transforming an object from one state to another.
Furthermore, the Court refused the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office's
(PTO) invitation to find all computer programs unpatentable.8 4 Still, the
Court held the claimed computer program patent ineligible, as it would
have "wholly pre-empt[ed] the8 mathematical
formula and.., would be a
5
patent on the algorithm itself."
But the Court cautioned against reading its holding to restrict
processes in general: "[t]hat a process may be patentable, irrespective of
86
the particular form of the instrumentalities used, cannot be disputed.,
Moreover, the Court noted that "[h]e who discovers a hitherto unknown
phenomenon of nature has no claim to a monopoly of it which the law
recognizes. If there is to be invention from such a discovery, it must come
from the applicationof the law of nature to a new and useful end.",87 The
Court also acknowledged the preemption doctrine, noting that a claim
runs afoul of§ 101 if it "purport[s] to cover any use of
the claimed method
88
type."
any
of
computer
digital
in a general-purpose
The Court expressed concern regarding the state of § 101 at the start
of the digital age, stating, "considerable problems are raised which only
committees of Congress can manage, for broad powers of investigation
are needed, including hearings which canvass89the wide variety of views
which those operating in this field entertain."

80. Id. § 1.03[6][d], at 1-204; see also In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141, 148-49 (C.C.P.A 1976)
and In re Freeman, 573 F.2d 1237, 1245-47 (C.C.P.A 1978) (struggling to apply Benson to

method and means claims).
81.
82.
83.

Benson, 409 U.S. at 65.
Id. at 70.
Id. at 71.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id. at 71-72.
Id. at 72.
Id. at 69-70 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 67 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id. at 64.
Id. at 73.
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B. Parker v. Flook
Six years later, the Court heard the first in a trilogy of patent eligibility
cases. 90 In Parker v. Flook, the Court again faced claims implicating the
91
exceptions to patent eligibility, and affirmed the exclusion in Benson.
The PTO had rejected claims directed to using a mathematical formula to
update alarm limits during a catalytic conversion process
where the
92
general process itself and the updating were well known.
Six justices agreed with the PTO and held the claims patent
ineligible. 93 Although the applicant attempted to distinguish his claims
from those in Benson, arguing that by employing the mathematical
equation the process was more efficient than otherwise, the Court found
that the addition of a specific application of a mathematical formula did
not make that formula patent eligible. 94 Instead, the Court reasoned that
any mathematical formula, whether novel or well known, should be
95
treated as a known piece of prior art when determining patent eligibility.
The Court also noted that a "phenomenon of nature or mathematical
formula ...cannot support a patent unless there is some other inventive
concept in its application.'9 Here, the Court found that the claims
seemed broad and without context, appearing to preempt any use of the
equation. 97 As a result, the Court held them patent ineligible. 98 Still, the
Court recognized that the "line between 99
a patentable process and an
unpatentable principle is not always clear."
The Court also addressed the concern that its reasoning stepped over
the line from patent eligibility to the patentability requirements under §§
102 and 103,100 reasoning that the mere applicationof a formula is not
patent eligible if the process itself (i.e., without the formula) would not
be patentable. 10' The Court noted that the application of a principle is
merely the application of "a relationship that has always existed" 10 2 and
is, therefore, insufficient without more to satisfy § 101.103 The Court
90. Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 584 (1978).
91. Id.at 585-86, 596.
92. Id.at 585-87.
93. Id.at 596.
94. Id.at 588-89.
95. Id. at 591-92; see also Mackay Radio & Tel. Co. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 306 U.S. 86,
94 (1939).
96. Flook,437 U.S. at 594.
97. Id.at 594-96.
98. Id.at 596.
99. Id.at 589 (internal quotation marks omitted).
100. Id.at 592-94.
101. Id. at 593-94.
102. Id.at593 n.15.
103. Id.at 593-94.
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reasoned that, to satisfy § 101, the application of a principle may qualify
as patent eligible.' 0 4 Nevertheless, the Court confused the issue in its
search for "some other inventive concept"' 0 5 in the application of a
mathematical
formula, again confusing novelty under § 102 with patent
06
eligibility. 1
Indeed, three justices dissented and argued that the majority's decision
blurred the line between § 101 and §§ 102-103.1°7 Justice Stewart pointed
out that, despite discussing precedent, the majority "strikes what seems
to me an equally damaging blow at basic principles of patent law by
importing into its inquiry
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 the criteria of novelty
''1 8
inventiveness.
and
The dissent also acknowledged Benson, but found that it stood
narrowly for the "long-established principle"' 10 9 "that laws of nature,
physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not patentable subject
matter." ' 0 Justice Stewart noted, however, that Flook's application was
different from the one in Benson: "[t]he issue here is whether a claimed
process loses its status of subject-matter patentability simply because one
step in the process would not be patentable subject matter if considered
in isolation."'11 The dissent reasoned that the claimed process, as a whole,
included steps that avoided the judicial exceptions and, thus rendering it
patent eligible under § 101.112
C. Reaction to Benson and Flook
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals' In re Bergy opinion
summarized the confusion created by Benson and Flook.1 13 As the
predecessor to the Federal Circuit and well-versed in patent law, the court
noted that:
we find in Flook an unfortunate and apparently unconscious,
though clear, commingling of distinct statutory provisions which
are conceptually unrelated, namely, those pertaining to the
categories of inventions in § 101 which may be patentable and to
the conditions for patentability demanded by the statute for
104. Id.at 594.
105.
106.

Id.
Seeid.

107. See id. at 598-600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
108. Id.at 600 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
109. Id.at 599.
110.

Id.at 598.

111.

Id.at 599.

112.

Id.

113. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958, 964-65 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacated in part sub nom.,
444 U.S. 1028 (1980), andaffd sub nom., 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
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inventions within the statutory categories, particularly the
nonobviousness condition of § 103. The confusion creeps in
through such phrases as "eligible for patent protection,"
"patentable process," "new and useful," "inventive application,"
"inventive concept," and "patentable invention." The lastmentioned term is perhaps one of the most difficult to deal with
unless it is used exclusively with reference to an invention which
complies with every condition
of the patent statutes so that a valid
114
patent may be issued on it.
In addition to that assessment, the Supreme Court itself would discuss in
Diehr115 the lack of clarity stemming from Benson and Flook, before
leaving patent eligibility determinations for processes up to the lower
courts for thirty years." 6 Despite the duration of its silence after Diehr,
the uncertainty caused by the Court's decisions in these cases would take
center stage again in Bilski."17
D. Diamond v. Chakrabarty
The Court next dealt with the patent eligibility of claims implicating
issues related to natural products and living organisms. 1 8 Specifically,
the claims in 1980's Diamondv. Chakrabartyconcerned a new bacterium
capable of digesting oil." 9 The patent examiner rejected the claims under
§ 101 upon finding that bacteria, even if man-made, could never satisfy
§ 101 because (i) microorganisms are inherently "products of nature" and
(ii) living things could never be patent eligible. 20 The Patent Office
Board of Appeals affirmed the examiner's rejections, but relied instead
on the exclusion of2 microorganisms from patent eligibility under the 1930
Plant Patent Act.' '
Chief Justice Burger began the Court's opinion by noting that the
' 22
question presented was "a narrow one of statutory interpretation,"'
namely whether the claimed microorganism constituted a "manufacture[]
or composition of matter."1 23 In doing so, he also acknowledged that
"Congress . .. recognized that the relevant distinction was not between
living and inanimate things, but between products of nature, whether
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Id.at 959 (emphasis added).
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
CompareDiehr, 450 U.S. at 175, with Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
See Bilski, 561 U.S. at 593.
See, e.g., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
Id.at 305.
Id.at 306.

121.

Id.

122.
123.

Id. at 307.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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living or not, and human-made inventions."' 124 The Court reasoned 25
that
any non-natural"product of human ingenuity" could be patentable.'
The Court then reiterated the well-known exceptions to the patent
eligibility calculus: "[t]he laws of nature, physical phenomena, and
abstract ideas[.] ' ' 126 The Court explained that the claim was "not to a
hitherto unknown natural phenomenon, but to a nonnaturally occurring
manufacture or composition of matter[.], 127 By finding the claimed
bacteria man-made, the Court found the claims (i) directed 28to a
"manufacture" and (ii) not within the product of nature exception.1
Despite the seemingly simple task of determining that man-made
products are not products of nature, the Court acknowledged the calculus
required and cautioned that courts "should not read into the patent laws
129
limitations and conditions which the legislature has not expressed."'
Indeed, the Court made its often-quoted proclamation that "anything
under the sun that is made by man 130 is patent eligible, citing legislative
history behind the 1952 Patent Act for support. 13 1 It is important to note
that the Court's proclamation relates to § 101; the Court says nothing
about patentability under §§ 102, 103, or 112.
The Court was far from unanimous.132 Indeed, four justicesBrennan, White, Marshall, and Powell-would have held the claims
patent ineligible.' 3 3 Specifically, and despite the majority's detailed
discussion related to the statute, the dissent opined that Congress had had
the opportunity to include
organisms like the claimed bacteria in § 101,
34
but had not done so.1
Despite the divisive nature of the decision, Chakrabartyspurred a new35
interest in patents, particularly in the emerging biotechnology industry.1
Moreover, the Court did not deal with the patentability of biological
subject matter again until Mayo'36 and Myriad.'37
124. Id. at 313; see also id. at 309 (dismissing the examiner's "living things" theory of
rejection).
125. Id. at 309; see also id. at 313 (observing that Congress had enacted the Plant Patent Act
to grant patentability to otherwise-unpatentable,useful inventions).
126. Id. at 309.
127.

Id.

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 309-10.
Id. at 308 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.at 309.
Id.;seealsoid. at 309 n.6.
Id. at 318 (noting the four dissenting Justices).
Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).

134.

Id. at 319-20.

135.
136.

See CmsuM, supra note 56, at I-OV 7.
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); see infra

Part IV.C.2.b.
137. Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107; see infra Part
IV.C.3.b.
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E. Diamond v. Diehr
The Court rendered its final patent eligibility decision before the
138
advent of the Federal Circuit just one year later. In Diamondv. Diehr,
the Court reassessed the role of equations in determining patent
eligibility.' 39 The applicant had claimed the use of thermocouples to
monitor the curing temperature of rubber in a mold and the interpretation
of data from those thermocouples to determine when to remove the
the
rubber from the mold. 40 The examiner had deemed claims involving
14 1
interpretation of resulting data using an equation to be ineligible.
The Court began by discussing Flook and Benson, downplaying the
confusion these cases had caused by asserting they stood for nothing
more than the well-known abstract ideas exception.' 42 Indeed, the Court
characterized the patent ineligible claims in those cases as directed to
mathematical formulae in the abstract, noting that they threatened to
preempt every use of the respective equations. 143 However, the Diehr
Court declared that the mere presence of an equation did not make a claim
patent ineligible. 144 Instead, in cases where the claims do not preempt
every use of an equation, the scope of the claims is less concerning under
§ 101.145 The Court recognized that "[i]t is now commonplace that an
application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a' 146
known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection."
To determine whether claims satisfy § 101 or fall under the exception,
14 7
the Court held that each claim must be considered as a whole.
Specifically, the Court explained:
In determining the eligibility of respondents' claimed process for
patent protection under § 101, their claims must be considered as
a whole. It is inappropriate to dissect the claims into old and new
elements and then to ignore the presence of the old elements in the
analysis. This is particularly true in a process claim because a new
combination of steps in a process may be patentable even though
all the constituents of the combination were well known and in

138.

Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981).

139. Id.at 176-77.
140. Id.at 177.
141. Id.at 179-80.
142. Id.at 185.
143. Id.at 186-87.
144. Id.at 187.
145. Id at 185-87.
146. Id at 187.
147. Id.at 188.
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148
common use before the combination was made.

The majority rejected the dissent's approach of ignoring portions of the
claims, as doing so "read[s] out of respondent's patent application all the
steps in the
claimed process which it determined were not novel or
'
inventive. 149
The Court found that the addition of thermocouples and the
monitoring step narrowed the use of the equation: "the respondents here
do not seek to patent a mathematical formula. Instead, they seek patent
protection for a process of curing synthetic
rubber."' 150 Accordingly, the
15 1
Court held the claims patent eligible.
In doing so, the Court narrowed Flook and addressed the blurred line
52
between patent eligibility and novelty that had since occurred.
Specifically, the Court explicitly explained that the claimed application
in Flook
did not purport to explain how these other variables were to be
determined, nor did it purport to contain any disclosure relating to
the chemical processes at work, the monitoring of process
variables, or the means of setting off an alarm or adjusting an alarm
system, [and that a]ll153
that it provides is a formula for computing an
updated alarm limit.

Despite Flook's language suggesting otherwise, the DiehrCourt declared
that novelty under § 102 is a completely separate consideration from §
101.154 Unfortunately, the Court did not clarify exactly how to reconcile
Flook with the supposedly clear line between § 101 and § 102.
The
55
confusion from Flook would again rise in Mayo v. Prometheus.1
Justice Stevens, the author of Flook-joined by Justice Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun--dissented. 156 He criticized the majority's
conclusion as to what the applicant had claimed, 157 namely a discovery
of "a method of constantly measuring the actual temperature inside a
rubber molding press."' 5 8 That said, Justice Stevens opined that he would
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. Id. at 193 n.15 (internal quotation marks omitted) (reasoning that such an approach "is
not the purpose of the § 101 inquiry").
150. Id. at 187.
151.

Id.at 191-93.

152.
153.

See id. at 186-87.
Id.(footnote omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

154.
155.
156.
157.

Id. at 191.
See infra Part IV.C.2.b.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 193 (noting the four dissenting Justices).
Id.at 206-07 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

158.

Id at 206 (adopting the applicant's characterization).
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have held such claims patent eligible if he had agreed with that
characterization. 59 But he did not agree, submitting instead that the
invention claimed "an improved method of calculating the time that the
mold should remain closed during the curing process."' 60 As a result, he
argued that such claims were patent ineligible.161
Moreover, Justice Stevens maintained that the majority misapplied
Flook by failing to distinguish between "the subject matter of what the
inventor claims to have discovered-the § 101 issue-and the question
162
whether that claimed discovery is in fact novel-the § 102 issue."
While Justice Stevens proffered that Diehr would confuse § 101
analyses,' 63 the Court left such determinations to the lower
courts,
64
primarily the Federal Circuit, for almost the next thirty years.'
IV. ACT III: CASES FROM THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
A. The Early Years
When the patent bar considers patent law jurisprudence, we often
think of the Federal Circuit. Indeed, as noted above in Part III, the
Supreme Court rendered only five opinions on patent eligibility under
§ 101-including the trilogy of Flook, Chakrabarty, and Diehrbetween 1952 and 2010, roughly spanning two generations of patent
practitioners. 165 In keeping with its pattern of reticence to deal with such
issues, the Supreme Court left patent law jurisprudence entirely to the
Federal Circuit from its creation in 1982 until 1988. And the Supreme
166
Court did not start "its foray into the real 'essentials' of patent law"'
until Markman v. Westview Instruments in 1996.167 Moreover, the
Supreme Court did not grant certiorarito a Federal Circuit case dealing
with 35 U.S.C. § 101 until 2001, when it agreed to hear J.E.M Ag Supply,
168
Inc. v. PioneerHi-Bred Int'l, Inc.
In J.E.M, the Court affirmed the Federal Circuit and held that claims
directed to human-made hybrid plants were patent eligible under § 101.169
159.

Id.at 207.

160.

Id. at 206-07.

161.
162.

Id.at219-20.
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 211 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

163.

Seeid. at210-11.

164. Compare Diehr,450 U.S. at 175, with Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
165. See supra Part III.
166. Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 2, at 822.
167. 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
168. 534 U.S. 124 (2001).
169. Id.at 145-46. J.E.M involved whether plants were patent eligible under § 101, in view
of the Plant Patent Acts of 1930 and 1970. Id.at 130. While J.E.M answered this question in the
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The Court relied on 1980's Chakrabartyin deciding J.E.M., noting the
importance of focusing on the words of the statute chosen by Congress,
and reiterating that § 101 was
expansive 170 and covered "anything under
'1 71
the sun.., made by man."
It was not until 2006 that the Court openly contemplated § 101
again. 172 In the interim, Justice Stevens penned a concurring opinion in
2002, noting that the Court should be wary of any institutional bias that
might come from the Federal Circuit's domination of patent law and
suggesting that the Supreme Court could take a more active role in the
future. 173 Specifically, in discussing the scope of jurisdiction exercised
by the Federal Circuit with respect to patent law, Justice Stevens
explained that "occasional decisions by courts with broader jurisdiction
will provide an antidote to the risk that the specialized court may develop
an institutional bias."' 174 Four
years later, Justice Breyer would adopt
175
concern.
Stevens's
Justice
B. A New Beginning. 2006
The year 2006 marked a shift at the Supreme Court with regard to its
interest in 35 U.S.C. § 101. As we suggested earlier, a close examination
of Justice Breyer's dissent from the dismissal of the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted in Lab Corp.176 laid the groundwork for the
Supreme Court's Mayo v. Prometheus
decision in 2012,177 a decision that
78
1
bar.
patent
the
of
much
surprised
In his dissent to the Lab Corp., Justice Breyer-joined by Justices
Stevens and Souter-criticized the state of patent eligibility
jurisprudence, signaling a shift in the Court's attention onto this
substantive issue.1 79 He began with the now familiar idea that laws of
nature are patent ineligible. 180 While recognizing that discovering
important laws of nature or mathematical formulae is not easy, Justice
affirmative, we pay no further text to the overlap between the two statutes, as such issues lend
themselves to entire papers themselves, and do not directly impact the issues discussed herein. Id.
at 145.
170. Id. at 130-31.
171. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
172. Bilksi v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
173. See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vomado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 839 (2002)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
174. Id.
175. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 657-60.
176. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
177. 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).
178. See Cox & Vandegrifi, supra note 1.
179. See Lab. Corp., 548 U.S. at 125-28, 136-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (per curiam).
180. Id. at 126-27.
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Breyer cautioned that difficulty, ingenuity, and usefulness are not the
only criteria for determining patent eligibility.' 8 ' He further noted how
patent laws must walk a fine line in fostering development as too much
protection can discourage research.182 Justice Breyer's dissent indicated
the Supreme Court's awareness of how diagnostic method claims
could
83
run afoul of the prohibition against patenting laws of nature.'
C. The Beginning of the End: 2010-2013
1. The Numbers
After 2006, the Supreme Court began hearing more cases involving
substantive patent issues, but did not weigh in on patent eligibility until
the 2010 Bilski v. Kappos case. 184 From 1952 to 1982, the Supreme Court
rendered opinions on the scope of § 101 only four times, recognizing the
expansive "anything under the sun made by man" doctrine.' 85 From 1982
to 2005, the Court rendered only one such op inion-J.E.M-and
followed its precedent from the 1952-1982 era.18P After zero opinions
regarding 35 U.S.C. § 101 from 2006 to 2009 (Justice Breyer's 2006
dissent to the Lab Corp. notwithstanding), the Court reprioritized the
matter and issued three opinions in just four years, shown in the table
below:

181.
182.
183.

Id. at 126.
Id. at 126-27.
Id. at 127-28.

184. 561 U.S. 593 (2010); see also Gajarsa& Cogswell, supranote 2, at 821-22 (noting the
increased patent caseload of the Supreme Court).
185.
186.

Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
J.E.M. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred, 534 U.S. 124, 145-46 (2001).
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1(11 JIIRTSPRIIENCE SINCE THE 1952 PATENT ACT

Number of Cases

1952-1957
1958-1962
1963-1967
1968-1972
1973-1977

0
0
0
1
0

1978-1982

3

Cases

Gottschalk v. Benson (1972)
Parkerv. Flook (1978)
Diamondv. Chakrabarty(1980)
Diamond v. Diehr(1981)

1983-1987
1988-1992
1993-1997
1998-2002
2003-2007

0
0
0
1
0

2008-2013

3

JE.M v. PioneerHi-Bred (2001)
Bilski v. Kappos (2010)
Mayo v. Prometheus(2012)

1 AMP v. Myriad (2013)

According to a breaking down of the era since the 1952 Patent Act
into twelve roughly five-year periods, the Supreme Court has largely
stayed away from patent eligibility except for the 1978-1982 and current
periods. While the recent increase itself is interesting,' 87 it is the
substance of those opinions that impact the patent bar and the global
economy.
2. From Bilski to Mayo
188
a. Bilski v. Kappos

The Bilski decision did not come as much of a surprise to the patent
bar. Indeed, the PTO even stated that its subject matter eligibility
determinations for "claims directed to abstract ideas" likely would not
change in view of Bilski. 189 Moreover, the claims in Bilski conceptually
appear closer to the patent-ineligible abstract ideas in Flook and Benson
than to the claims in Mayo. That said, process and method claims had
187.

See generally Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 2, at 821-22.

188.

Bilski, 561 U.S. at 593.

189. See Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Acting Assoc. Comm'r for Patent
Examination Policy to Patent Examining Corps, Interim Guidance for Determining Subject Matter
Eligibility for Process Claims in View of Bilski v. Kappos (July 27, 2010), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/bilskiguidance_27jul2010.pdf.
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caused confusion before, and Bilski was the first time the Court dealt with
them in the context
of § 101 (other than JE.M and Lab. Corp.) in almost
90
thirty years.'

Bilski reached the Supreme Court from the PTO via the Federal
Circuit, which en banc had thoroughly reviewed the meaning of
"process" under § 101 in view of claims directed to a method of hedging
investment losses.' 91 Unlike all four of the cases discussed in Part III,192the
Federal Circuit here had affirmed the PTO's rejection of the claims.
The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the Federal Circuit,
holding the claimed methods were patent ineligible.' 93 The Court
reasoned that the claims could not stand because they "would pre-empt
use of this approach in all fields, and would effectively grant a monopoly
over an abstract idea."' 94 Even so, the Court rejected the95opportunity to
declare business methods categorically patent ineligible.
Significantly, the Court made clear that § 101 broadly covers "any"
new and useful process, as Congress intended that patent eligibility be
given "wide scope" so as to liberally encourage innovation. 196 The
Court's reasoning followed from Chakrabarty in recognizing the
exceptions to the otherwise broad patent-eligibility principles: "laws of
nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas."' 197 Further, the majority
acknowledged the difference between patent eligibility under § 101, and
patentability under §§ 102, 103, and 112, expressly noting that a patent
eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test, and that the invention must also
satisfy the requirements under §§ 102, 103, and 112.198
Although following the Court's own precedent, the Justices penned
several opinions demonstrating the Court's lack of uniformity, crafting a
decision Professor Chisum has called "a remarkably inconclusive
contribution to the law on patent-eligible subject matter."' 199 Justice
Kennedy wrote the Court's opinion, which Justices Roberts, Thomas, and
Alito joined, and Justice Scalia also joined except for Parts II.B.2 and

190.

CompareChakrabarty,447 U.S. at 303 (decided in 1980), with Bilski, 561 U.S. at 593

(decided in 2010).
191.
192.

Bilski, 561 U.S. at600.
Id.

193. Id. at 611. Despite its affirmance, the Court rejected the Federal Circuit's adoption of
the machine-or-transformation test as the sole test of determining patent eligibility ofsuch claims.
Id. at 604. The Court held that, while the test is "a useful and important clue, an investigative tool,
...
[it] is not the sole test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible 'process."' Id.
194.
195.

Id. at 612.
Id. at611-12

196.
197.
198.

Id.at 601-02 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980)).
Id.at 601.
Id.at 602.

199.

CHISUM, supra note 56, § 1.03[6][m] at 62.

JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGYLA WAND POLICY

[Vol. 19

II.C.2.2 °° Justice Stevens-joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and
Sotomayor-concurred.2 °' Justice Breyer filed another concurring
opinion, which Justice Scalia joined in Part 11.212
In reasoning that the claims were not patent eligible, Justice Kennedy
emphasized that the Court was "not commenting on the patentabilityof
any particular invention, let alone holding that any of the abovementioned
technologies from the Information Age should or should not receive
patent protection." 20 3 The Court also expressed concerns that business
method patents "raise special problems in terms of vagueness and suspect
validity," 20 4 and could "put a chill on creative endeavor and dynamic
change." 205 A complete ban on such patents under § 101, however, would
provide a limitation, while the requirements of novelty, nonobviousness,
and written description serve to balance "between stimulating innovation
by protecting inventors and impeding progress by granting patents when
not justified by the statutory design.'2o6
Justice Stevens, in his concurrence, "strongly disagree[d] with the
Court's disposition of this case." 20 7 He called out the majority, noting that
the Court "never provides a satisfying account of what constitutes an
unpatentable abstract idea. 20 8 Moreover, he reasoned that the majority's
approach, which included "statements about how to define the term
'process' in § 101 ...tinker[ed] with the bounds of the category of
unpatentable, abstract ideas[.] ' ' 20 9 Justice Stevens cautioned against this
approach, asserting the majority's suggestion that "any series of steps that
is not itself an abstract idea or law of nature may constitute a21 'process'
within the meaning of § 101 . . . [could] only cause mischief.,
To Justice Stevens, "a claim that merely describes a method of doing
business does not qualify as a 'process' under § 101. '' 211 Basing his
conclusion on a result that he submitted would "restore patent law to its
historical and constitutional moorings," 212 Justice Stevens opined that the
eligible subject matter is "broad[,] [b]ut it is not
scope of21patent
3
endless."
200.

Bilski, 561 U.S. at 596.

201.
202.

Id.at 613.
Id.at 658.

203.

Id. at 606 (emphasis added).

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

Id.at 608.
Id.
Id.at 609.
concurring).
Id.at 657 (Stevens, J.,
Id at 621.
Id.at 613.
Id.at 614.
Id.
Id.at 613.
Id.at657.
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Justice Breyer agreed with Justice Stevens in that he would hold the
claimed method patent ineligible, but wrote separately in view of what he
called "the need for clarity and settled law in this highly technical
area." 214 He noted how both Justice Stevens and Justice Kennedy
confirmed that § 101 is broad, but its scope is not unlimited.2 15
Despite criticizing the formulaic approach of the Federal Circuit and
rejecting the machine-or-transformation test as the sole test of
patentability (and affirming the invalidation of the claims), 216 the Court
declared that "[r]ather than adopting categorical rules that might have
wide-ranging and unforeseen impacts, the Court resolves this case
narrowly[.], 217 While the Bilski decision arguably did not limit patent
eligibility any more than Flook or Benson did, the Court's decision in
Mayo would significantly restrict the reach of § 101.21
219

b. Mayo v. Prometheus
(1) Summary

In 2012, the Supreme Court's Mayo decision unanimously declared
patent ineligible the kinds of diagnostic method claims present in Lab.
Corp.220 The asserted claims were directed generally to methods of (i)
administering thiopurine to a patient, (ii) determining the levels of
thiopurine or thiopurine metabolites in the patient's blood, (iii)
comparing those measured levels to known metabolite levels, and (iv)
adjusting the dose based on the comparison in step (iii) to reduce toxicity
and enhance efficacy. 22 1 The district court held the claims invalid, finding
that they covered a patent ineligible natural law, namely the correlation
between (i) metabolite levels and (ii) toxicity and efficacy of dosage.222
223
The Federal Circuit reversed in 2009 (and again in 2010 en banc),
concluding (pursuant to the machine-or-transformation test) that the

214. Id.(Breyer, J., concurring).
215. Id. at658.
216. Id. at 613.
217. Id. at 609 (majority opinion).
218. See id.at 609. ("[T]he Court resolves this case narrowly on the basis of this Court's
decisions in Benson, Flook, and Diehr ... [because] the patent application at issue here falls
outside of§ 101 because it claims an abstract idea.").
219. Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012).

220. Id.at 1305; see also Part Iv.C.
221. Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1295.
222. Id. at 1296.
.223. See Prometheus Labs, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 581 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed.
Cir. 2009), vacated and remanded in light of Bilski, 130 S.Ct. 3543; Prometheus Labs, Inc. v.
Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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claims covered transformation of the body or blood.224
Upon granting certiorari, the Supreme Court ordered the Federal
Circuit to rehear the appeal in view of Bilski.225 The Federal Circuit again
found the claims patent eligible as "drawn not to a law of nature, but to a
particular application of naturally occurring correlations, and
accordingly [the claims] do not preempt all uses of the recited
226
correlations between metabolite levels and drug efficacy or toxicity.
The Supreme Court
granted certiorari again, and reversed the Federal
227
Circuit's opinion.
Justice Breyer authored the unanimous opinion finding the claims
patent ineligible.228 The Court described its precedent on § 101, relying
heavily on Le Roy and Morse, acknowledging that all inventions embody
or apply laws of nature to some degree, and deciding that processes that
apply natural laws in a particular, useful way, were at least patent
eligible.229 But the Court also recognized that phenomena of nature and
abstract ideas are patent ineligiblebecause the "monopolization of those
basic tools through the grant of a patent might tend to impede innovation
more than it would tend to promote it." 230 The Court reasoned that the
exceptions were created to prevent the231
monopolization of the "basic tools
of scientific and technological work.,
Justice Breyer summarized the question presented as whether the
claims amounted only to natural laws, or whether the methods added
enough to the correlations recited to satisfy § 101.232 Although the Court
acknowledged that the claims included three steps beyond the natural
laws, it nevertheless found these steps insufficient to satisfy § 101.233
First, the Court found that the administering step merely referred to
the relevant audience of the invention, reasoning that limiting the use of
the natural law to a particular field of practice cannot satisfy § 101.234
Second, Justice Breyer explained how the "wherein" clause only
informed doctors that they should consider the recited natural laws-the
correlation between thiopurine metabolite levels and efficacy and
toxicity-in their practice. 235 Third, the Court found that the
"determining" step covered "well-understood, routine, and conventional
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1296.
Id.
Mayo, 628 F.3d at 1355 (emphasis added).
Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1305.
Id. at 1293.
Id. at 1293-94.
Id. at 1293.
Id.
Id.at 1294.
Id.at 1298.
Id. at 1297.
Id.
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activit[ies].,, 236 As these were well-known, the Court held the claimed
subject matter was not patent eligible.237
Thus, the Court held that as the aforementioned steps were beyond
natural law but at least partially obvious, they did not "transform
unpatentable [patent ineligible] natural correlations
into patentable
238
[patent eligible] applications of those regularities."
The Court also expounded that the expansive view of § 101, despite
being supported by the legislative history and its precedent to date, did
not equate to a lenient threshold for method claims. 239 Specifically, the
Court rejected the view that virtually all steps beyond a statement of a
natural law should meet the requirements of § 101, purporting the
patentability calculus under §§ 102, 103, and 112 sufficed to determine
240
whether claims should issue and withstand scrutiny in litigation.
Indeed, Justice Breyer reasoned that the policy concerns that underlie
§ 101 were distinct from those of the "other" patentability
requirements. 24 1 Specifically, the Court rejected the view that virtually all
steps beyond a statement of a natural law should meet the requirements
of § 101 and purported to leave the patentability calculus under §§ 102,
103, and 112 to determine whether claims should issue and withstand
scrutiny in litigation. 242 Yet, he also noted the blurry nuance between the
conceptual distinctions in explaining that,
[w]e recognize that, in evaluating the significance of additional
steps, the § 101 patent-eligibility inquiry and, say, the § 102
novelty inquiry might sometimes overlap. But that need not always
be so. And to shift the patent-eligibility inquiry entirely to these
later sections risks creating significantly greater legal uncertainty,
while assuming that those sections can do work that they are not
equipped to do.24 3
Despite admitting a confusing flaw in its method for determining the
patent eligibility of method claims touching on natural laws or
phenomena-namely that its test for patent eligibility includes an
obviousness determination-the Court's attempt to justify the flaw
instead compounded it. A look at the first attempt by the PTO and en banc
Federal Circuit opinion to wrestle with Mayo show the uncertainty the
236.

Id.

237.

Id. at 1297-98.

238.

Id. at 1298.

239.

See id. at 1301-02.

240.

Seeid. at 1304.

241.
242.

Id. at 1304-05.
Id. at 1304.

243.

Id.
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Court caused.
(2) Reaction from the PTO: Confusion
On March 21, 2012, the PTO issued a memorandum on the Mayo
decision instructing its examiners to "continue to ensure that claims,
particularly process claims, are not directed to an exception to eligibility
such that the claim amounts to a monopoly on the law of nature, natural
phenomenon, or abstract idea itself., 244 The PTO issued a similar
memorandum on July 3, 2012.245 While the July 3 memorandum
expressly superseded the March 21 memorandum, it elaborated on the
same instructions:
In summary, process claims having a natural principle as a limiting
element or step should be evaluated by determining whether the
claim includes additional elements/steps or a combination of
elements/steps that integrate the natural principle into the claimed
invention such that the natural principle is practically applied, and
are sufficient to ensure that the claim amounts to significantly
more than the natural principle itself. If the claim as a whole
satisfies this inquiry, the claim is directed to patent-eligible subject
matter. If the claim as a whole does not satisfy this inquiry, it
should be rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to nonstatutory subject matter.246
The PTO also noted that "[p]rocess claims that are directed to abstract
ideas . . . should continue to be examined using the . . . Interim Bilski
247
Guidance[.],
The PTO recognized the recent increase in patent eligibility cases
coming from the courts that were impacting its practices. 248 Specifically,
the PTO noted not only that "Mayo has provided additional details for the
[patent] eligibility analysis that the [PTO] developed after Bilski," but
also that the courts, namely the Federal Circuit, "will provide insight

244. Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Assoc. Comm'r for Patent Examination
Policy to Patent Examining Corps, Supreme Court Decision in Mayo CollaborativeServices v.
PrometheusLaboratories,Inc., 2 (Mar. 21, 2012), availableat http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/
exam/mayoprelimguidance.pdf
245. See Memorandum from Andrew H. Hirshfeld, Deputy Comm'r for Patent Examination
Policy, to Patent Examining Corps, 2012 Interim Procedure for Subject Matter Eligibility
Analysis of Process Claims Involving Laws of Nature (July 3, 2012), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/law/exam/2012_interimguidance.pdf.
246. Id.
247. Id.at 1.
248. See id.
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regarding the full reach of Bilski and Mayo.,,249 Despite stating it would
wait on the courts for that further guidance, the PTO issued detailed
"Essential Inquiries for Subject Matter
Eligibility Under 35 U.S.C. § 101"
2 50
memorandum.
2012
3,
July
its
in
The PTO also issued "Detailed Guidance for Using the Inquiries" in
the same July 3 memorandum.2 5 1 The PTO instructed that the first step in
its patent eligibility analysis is determining what the applicant invented
in light of the broadest reasonable interpretation of the claims. 252 In fact,
the PTO notes in its examples that because Mayo requires claims that
include use of a natural principle, such claims "must also include
additional elements or steps to show that the inventor has practically
253
applied, or added something significant to, the natural principle itself.
These "additional elements or steps must relate to the natural principle in
a significant way to impose a meaningful limit on the claim scope. The
analysis turns on whether the claim has added enough to show a practical
application." 254 As shown below, consideration of claim
scope should be
255
an important factor in determining patent eligibility.
(3) Reaction
Despite his protests to the contrary, Justice Breyer confused the
conditions for patentability (i.e., obviousness) with the Court's patent
eligibility calculus. 256 If claimed steps are man-made and apply a natural
law, the claim should be patent eligible, which does not speak to its
patentability under §§ 102, 103, or 112.257 Indeed, if those steps are
routine or otherwise obvious or not novel, the claim should fall under
§§ 102 or 103, not § 101.
In the end, Justice Breyer failed to differentiate between § 101 and the
other patentability requirements, negating the seminal tenets of statutory
interpretation, and facially rejecting the legislative history and intent
behind § 101.258 That foundation, which is fully incorporated in the
249. Id.
250. Id. at 2.
251. See Hirshfeld, supra note 245, at 2-6.
252. Id. at 2.
253. Id. at 3.
254. Id. (emphasis added).
255. In its July 3rd memorandum, the PTO also noted that "a claim does not have to be novel
or non-obvious to qualify as a subject matter eligible claim. Moreover, a claim that is deemed
eligible is not necessarily patentable unless it also complies with the other statutory and nonstatutory considerations for patentability under §§ 101 (utility and double patenting), 102, 103,
and 112, and non-statutory double patenting." Id. at 4-5.
256. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289,1304 (2012).
257. See Hirshfeld, supra note 245, at 4-5.
258. See Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1304.
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precedent Justice Breyer cites, mandates a broad reading of § 101. The
practical result of Mayo is not unfounded, but the reasoning behind it is.
3. CLS Bank and Myriad V: The End?
Despite its procedural posture, Lab Corp. foreshadowed the Supreme
Court's revived interest in patent eligibility determinations culminating
in Myriad V.2 5 9 But before we discuss that case, we look at how the
Supreme Court has influenced the purportedly biased judges of the
specialized Federal Circuit.
a. CLS Bank
The Federal Circuit's CLS Bank v. Alice Corp26 0 decision showed the
extent of confusion caused by the Supreme Court's recent § 101
jurisprudence. Described as a "Nightmare Ruling" 261 and a "Fractured
Affirmance," 262 the Federal Circuit's per curiam, majority opinion only
affirmed the district court's holdings that (i) "the asserted method and
computer-readable media claims are not directed to eligible subject
matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101" and (ii) "the asserted system claims are
not directed to eligible subject matter under that statute." 263 That is the
extent of the majority opinion, but there are six more thorough opinions
to consider.
The three sets of claims were directed to (i) a method, (ii) a system,
and (iii) a computer readable medium, all for managing risks during
financial transactions. 264 The appeal focused upon whether the claims
represent an "abstract idea" that would fail to satisfy § 101.265 Following
limited discovery, CLS Bank moved for summary judgment. 266 Although
the district court did not
construe the claims, the parties stipulated to a
26 7
narrow construction.

259. See Myriad V, 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013).
260. CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty., Ltd., 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (en banc) (per
curiam) [hereinafter CLS Bank II].
261. Ryan Davis, 'Nightmare' Ruling on Software Patent Standard Baffles Attys,
LAw360.COM (May 13, 2013, 9:37 PM), www.law360.com/articles/440975.
262. Courtenay C. Brinkerhoff, Federal CircuitIssues FracturedAffirmance in CLS Bank
v. Alice Corporation, PHARMAPATENTS (May 12, 2013), http://www.pharmapatentsblog.com/
2013/05/12/federal-circuit-issues-fractured-affirmance-in-cls-bank-v-alice-corporation/.
263. CLS Bank II, 717 F.3d at 1273.
264. Id.at 1284-85 (Lourie, J.,
concurring).
265. Id.at 1275-76.
266. Id.at 1275.
267. Id.at 1328-29. The Federal Circuit judges, despite failing to agree on much regarding
determinations of patent eligibility, do appear to agree that, while not required, construing the
claims before addressing § 101 often would be helpful. See, e.g., Id. at 1282 ("[C]onducting a
claim construction before addressing § 101 may be especially helpful .. .by facilitating a full
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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of CLS Bank, 268
holding that each of the asserted method claims were directed to "an
abstract idea of employing an intermediary to facilitate simultaneous
exchange of obligations in order to minimize risk" and therefore failing
to satisfy § 101.269 The court also held patent ineligible the computer
readable medium and system claims upon finding them directed to "the
same abstract concept despite the fact they nominally recite a different
category of invention[.] 27 Alice
Corp. appealed and the Federal Circuit
27 1
banc.
en
case
the
hear
to
agreed
272
The Federal Circuit held that the claims failed to satisfy § 101 only.
All ten judges relied on the same precedent, including Benson, Flook,
Diehr,Bilski, and Mayo, and recognized the same judicial exceptions to
§ 101.273 The court also recognized that to avoid the abstract idea
exception, a claimed method must include "meaningful limitations"
beyond that idea.274 But that is where the agreement between the ten
judges ended.275 Specifically, seven judges agreed that the method and
computer readable medium claims were directed to patent ineligible
subject matter.276 Even so, no majority agreed on the reasoning for that
conclusion or a test for reaching it. 277 Lastly, the court was divided evenly
on the subject matter eligibility of the system claims. 278 As a result, the
district court's finding that those claims are patent ineligible stood.2 79
We provide a brief summary of those Federal Circuit opinions to show
how the Supreme Court's recent dealings with § 101 have confused the
jurists most versed in patent law and left patent practitioners with unclear
guidance.

understanding of what each claim entails."). Likewise, Judge Rader observed in his majority
opinion in Ultramercial that "in part because of the factual issues involved [in determining
whether claims satisfy § 101], claim construction normally will be required." Ultramercial, Inc.
v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
268. CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 768 F. Supp. 2d 221, 255 (D.D.C. 2011) [hereinafter
CLS Bank 1].
269. Id. at 243.
270. Id. at 255.
271. CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp., 484 F. App'x. 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012); CLSBankI, 717
F.3d at 1273.
272. CLSBankI, 717 F.3d at 1273-74.
273. See id. at 1277-80 (Lourie, J., concurring).
274.

Id. at 1281.

275. See, e.g., id. at 1306 n.7 (Rader, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
276. See id. at 1273.
277. See, e.g., id at 1287 (Lourie, J., concurring); id. at 1313 n.1 (Moore, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
278. Id. at 1273.
279. Id.
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(1) Judge Lourie's Concurring Opinion
Judge Lourie-joined by Judges Dyk, Prost, Reyna, and Wallach-280
recognized both the difficulty in applying "the patent-eligibility test"
and the breadth of § 101, citing Chakrabartyfor the "four broadly stated
categories of patent eligible subject matter., 281 He also noted that it is
"important to recognize that § 101, while far-reaching, only addresses
patent eligibility, not overall patentability."282 Despite this claimed
awareness, and akin to Justice Breyer in Mayo, he then confuses the issue
by incorporating obviousness into his § 101 analysis.2 83 Despite noting
that "danger also lies in applying the judicial exceptions too
Judge Lourie followed the Supreme Court against his
aggressively[,]"
2 84
own warning.
Judge Lourie suggested a two-step process for determining patent
eligibility that focused on the "practical likelihood of a claim preempting
a fundamental concept." 285 Specifically, he reasoned that the court must
determine whether the claim posed a risk of preemption (i.e., directed to
patent-ineligible abstract ideas).286 If so, the court must identify the
underlying "abstract idea," and determine whether the claim adds
"enough" to it to sufficiently limit the claim "to a narrower, patent287
eligible application of that idea[.],,
Judge Lourie followed Mayo, stating that the qualities that render
patentable subject matter distinct from an abstract idea should not be
"routine" or "conventional. 288 He focused on preemption, reasoning that
§ 101 is the place to eliminate claims that fail to add "significantly more"
than just a basic principle. 289 Based on these concerns, Judge Lourie
found the method claims directed to an abstract idea, "untethered from
any real-world application."290
Judge Lourie found the computer readable medium claims to be
"merely method claims in the guise of a device" 291 and opined that they

280. Id. at 1273, 1277 (Lourie, J., concurring).
281. Id. at 1276.

282. Id. Indeed, Judge Lourie notes that distinction from both Diehr and Mayo. See id. at
1280, 1282-83 (noting that the Mayo decision uses the terms "routine" and "conventional" in this
context).
283. See id. at 1282-83.
284. Id. at 1277.
285. Id.

286. Id.at 1282.
287. Id. at 1290.

288. Id. at 1283-84 (Lourie, J., concurring).
289. Id. at 1282-84.

290. Id. at 1286.
291. Id.at 1288.
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do not add sufficient steps to the underlying abstract idea. 292 In doing so,
he indicated that an analysis for subject matter eligibility should account
for the state of the prior art, compounding the error of incorporating
obviousness into § 101.293
Under the guidance of Mayo, 294
five Federal Circuit judges essentially
eviscerated § 101 determinations.
(2) Chief Judge Rader's Concurrence-in-Part, Dissent-in-Part
Chief Judge Rader-joined by Judge Moore-agreed with the
plurality regarding the patent eligibility of the method and computer
readable medium claims, but disagreed with Judge Lourie's proposed
analysis in reaching those conclusions. 295 Specifically, he rejected Judge
Lourie's suggestion to separate the claim into an "abstract idea" and
"limitations on the abstract idea" and instead argued for evaluating the
claim as a whole. 296 He reasoned that stripping down a claim as suggested
by Judge Lourie would
remove all of its concrete limitations, until at its core, something
that could be characterized as an abstract idea is revealed. Such an
approach would "if carried to its extreme, make all inventions
unpatentable because all inventions can be reduced to underlying
principles of nature 297
which, once known, make their
obvious."
implementation
Chief Judge Rader's reasoning pushes back not only at Judge Lourie's
approach, but the confusion created by the Supreme Court in Mayo and
Flook (and Benson). "[T]he Federal Circuit had been saddled with
difficult Supreme Court precedents," including those cases.2 98 Chief
292.

Id.at 1286. Judge Lourie also would reject the system claims on similar grounds. See

id.
293. See id.
(Lourie, J., concurring).
294. See id. at 1273-92; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct.
1289, 1293 (2012) (holding too broad an interpretation of these exclusions from § 101 "could
eviscerate patent law."); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603 (2010) ("This Court has not
indicated that the existence of these well-established exceptions gives the Judiciary carteblanche
to impose other limitations that are inconsistent with the text and the statute's purpose and
design.").
295. See CLS Bank 11, 717 F.3d at 1292, 1297-98 (Rader, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
296. See id.at 1298. Judge Rader reasons that the § 101 "inquiry is a practical one to
determine whether the claim, as a whole with all of its limitations, in effect covers a patent
ineligible abstract idea or a patent eligible application of that idea" Id. (emphasis added).
297. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 189 n.12 (1981)).
298. Richard D. Rochford et al., Nuggets in the Ashes: A Few Guidepostsfrom CLS Bank
v. Alice Corporation, HAYNES & BOONE (May 16, 2013), http://www.haynesboone.com/cls-bank-
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Judge Rader warned that "[a] court cannot go hunting for abstractions by
ignoring the concrete, palpable,
tangible limitations of the invention the
' 99
claims.
actually
patentee
Moreover, Chief Judge Rader's choice of the word "obvious" in this
context is no accident. Indeed, he states plainly that "[t]he eligibility
inquiry is not an inquiry into obviousness, novelty, enablement, or any
other patent law concept; "300 it is "distinct from the validity requirements
of the other sections." ' Chief Judge Rader responded to Judge Lourie
(and the Supreme Court) stating that "whether a new process, machine,
and so on is 'inventive' is not an issue under Section 101; the condition
for 'more' than novelty is contained only in Section 103. "3o2 In doing so,
Chief Judge Rader looked to Diehr and Mayo, showing that "[t]he
Supreme Court repeatedly has cautioned against conflating the analysis
of the conditions ' 3of
patentability in the Patent Act with inquiries into
03
"
eligibility.
patent
Chief Judge Rader-joined again by Judge Moore, as well as Judges
Linn and O'Malley-also dissented regarding the system claims. 30 4 In
doing so, he acknowledged that the heart of the determination is based on
judicial exceptions to broad, statutory subject matter. 30 5 Indeed, Chief
Judge Rader notes that "one of the principles that must guide our inquiry
is that judge-made exceptions
to properly enacted statutes are to be
30 6
narrowly construed.

This axiom seems lost on the Supreme Court and the plurality of the
Federal Circuit struggling to follow it.30 7 Chief Judge Rader took
exception to Judge Lourie's approach (again, per Supreme Court
guidance), stating that "[1]abeling this system claim an 'abstract concept'
wrenches all meaning from those words, and turns a narrow exception
into one which may swallow the expansive rule..." 30 8 and that "[b]road
v-alice-corporation/ (noting that the CLS Bank opinions showed that "the Federal Circuit is clearly
looking for outside help.").
299. CLSBankI1, 717 F.3d at 1298 (Rader, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
300. Id. at 1302
301.

Id. at 1303.

302. Id. at 1294.
303. Id. at 1303 (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 190 (1981)); see also Mayo
Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1304 (2012).
304. CLSBankI, 717 F.3d at 1292 (Rader, J.,
dissenting in part).
305. See id. at 1303.
306. Id. (emphasis added); see Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1342 (Fed.
Cir. 2013); see also W. Union Tel. Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 514 (1945); see also United
States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 559 (1979); see also CLSBankI, 717 F.3d at 1290 (discussing
whether an abstract idea may be patent eligible if enough information is added to narrowly
construe the claim).
307. SeeCLSBankII,717F.3dat 1304.
308. Id. at 1309.
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inclusivity is the Congressional goal of Section 101, not a flaw."3 0 9 Chief
Judge Rader further warned that "U]udicially created exceptions must not
be permitted to thwart that goal. 310
(3) Judge Moore's Dissent-in-Part
Judge Moore-joined by Judges Rader, Linn and O'Malleydissented-in-part. 31' She argued that the expansion of the abstract idea
exception to statutory subject matter eligibility will cause a "free fall in
the patent system[,]" noting that those who would hold "all of these
claims [to be] directed to no more than an abstract idea gives
staggering
312
exception."
judicial
narrow
a
be
to
meant
is
what
to
breadth
Judge Moore also stated that Judge Lourie confused patent eligibility
determinations under § 101 analysis with the calculus required by the13
other patentability requirements under §§ 102, 103, and 112.'
Specifically, she noted that if the claims recite a known idea, then they
should fail as being obvious and, if the claim is directed to a machine that
is not sufficiently detailed, the claim should fail under the provisions of
§ 112.3'4 Such claims should not be foreclosed from patent eligibility in
view of an improperly broad interpretation of
the exceptions to statutory
31
subject matter patent eligibility under § 101. 1
(4) The Linn and O'Malley Dissent
Judges Linn and O'Malley dissented, arguing that the analyses by
Judges Lourie and Rader are flawed, as the district court had yet to
construe the claims. 316 With respect to Chief Judge Rader's opinion, they
noted that the method claims should be patent eligible for the same
reasons that he gave related to the systems claims. 317 They also criticized
Judge Lourie's opinion as internally inconsistent-noting that by
construing the claims broadly and limiting his analysis to what he
309. Id.at 1304.
310.

Id.

311.

Id.at 1313 (Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

312.

Id.

313. Seeid.at 1320-21.
314. Id.
315. See id.
at 1321.
316. Id. at 1327-28 (Linn, J., dissenting). Notably, of the cases discussed herein, only Lab.
Corp. involved construed claims. See Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548
U.S. 124, 130 (2006) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting). Indeed, the 1978-1981 trilogy of cases and Bilski all
reached the Supreme Court from the PTO without being heard at the district court level. See Parker
v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 587-88 (1978); Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 306-07 (1980);
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 181 (1981); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 600 (2010).
317. See CLS Bank I,717 F.3d at 1329-30 (Linn, J., dissenting).
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considers "the fundamental concept wrapped up in the claim," only then
was he able to find absent any "substantive limitations that [sufficiently]
narrow[ed], confine[d], or otherwise tie[d] down the claim" to render it
him
patent eligible. 318 Judge Lourie's reasoning is then circular, allowing
319
to reach the conclusion he asserts that Bilski and Mayo require.
Judges Linn and O'Malley closed by raising the now common cry that
320
only Congress can refine patent law to expressly limit patent eligibility.
(5) Judge Newman's Concurrence-in-Part, Dissent-in-Part
Judge Newman began as follows: "The ascendance of section 101 as
an independent source of litigation, separate from the merits of
patentability, is a new uncertainty for inventors." 321 The divisions within
the Federal Circuit, which are readily apparent in CLS Bank, show this
uncertainty in stark contrast to the broad scope of the statute with which
the opinions dealt. As Judge Newman observed, instead of bringing
clarity and objective standards to § 101,
[W]e have propounded at least three incompatible standards,
devoid of consensus, serving simply to add to the unreliability and
cost of the system of patents as an incentive for innovation....
...The uncertainty of administrative and judicial outcome and the
high cost of resolution are a disincentive to both innovators and
322
competitors.
She urged a return to the statute, with subject matter eligibility turning
solely upon whether the invention fits within one of the recited classes of
patent eligible subject matter, leaving the prevention of unduly broad
claims to §§ 102, 103 and 112.323 Judge Newman suggested avoiding the
unnecessary debate over "preemption" (i.e., the basis for the plurality
opinion and recent Supreme Court concern)
by limiting the effect patents
324
might have on future developments.
(6) Chief Judge Rader's "Additional Reflections"
Chief Judge Rader closed with reflections on the state of § 101
318.

Id.at 1331 (quoting id. at 1282 (Lourie, J.,
concurring)).

319.

See id.

320.
321.
322.
323.
324.

Id.at
Id.at
Id.
Id.at
Id.at

1333.
1321 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1322, 1326.
1322, 1324 n.3.
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jurisprudence. 325 Like Judge Newman, he suggested reverting to the
statute, and always starting a § 101 determination with the statute and not
judicial abstractions such as "inventiveness" and "preemption." 32 6 In
doing so, Chief Judge Rader traced the evolution of the abstract idea
exception from Benson to Flook and Diehr,recognizing that the "abstract
idea" exception is difficult to apply. 327 His suggested cure, returning to
the statute, 328 echoes the breadth of cases discussed in Part III above.
(7) Reaction
CLS Bank shows that the Federal Circuit has fractured under the
Supreme Court's § 101 jurisprudence. Such confusion regarding the
fundamental inquiries under § 101 leaves industries relying upon patents
with muddled and impractical guidance as to whether their inventions are
patent eligible--even before their applications are subject to the rigors of
§§ 102, 103, and 112 to determine patentability. Indeed, the Federal
Circuit, aware of the conundrum § 101 now poses, is calling on the
Supreme Court to definitively establish rules for patent eligibility. 329 If
nothing else, CLS Bank should show the Supreme Court that the court
most versed in patent law cannot come to a consensus in light of the
Supreme Court's precedent. 330 Moreover, district court judges dealing
with patent eligibility challenges, the PTO faced with providing its
examiners with examination guidelines, and patent practitioners
wrestling with advising even the most patent-savvy clients, have never
faced a more difficult calculus under § 101.
b. Myriad V
(1) The Holding
Myriad V33 1 deals with composition of matter or manufacture claims,
which are conceptually simpler than the process claim in Mayo or the
325.
326.

See id. at 1333-36 (Rader, J., additional reflections).
See id. at 1334-35 ("When all else fails, consult the statute!").

327.
328.

Id.
Id.at 1335.

at 1321 (Newman, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (referring
329. See, e.g., id.
to the opinion as "judicial deadlock"); see also id. at 1314 (Moore, J., dissenting in part) ("This
case presents the opportunity for the Supreme Court to distinguish between claims that are and
are not directed to patentable [i.e., patent eligible] subject matter.").
330. See Ryan Davis, supra note 262 ("If you look at the Federal Circuit opinion, they're
struggling to come up with a bright-line rule, but the Supreme Court doesn't have a better brightline rule in mind, or it would have put it in place in Bilski." (quoting Matthew Moore of Latham
& Watkins LLP)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
331.

Myriad V, 133 S. Ct. 2107(2013).
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business method claims in Bilski.332 But, like those cases, the Court's
holding in Myriad Vwas unanimous and found patent ineligible (at least
some of the) claims. 333 That said, it is the first time since J.E.M in which
the Supreme Court found patent eligible any claim challenged under
§ 101. 3 34 Specifically, the Court held patent eligible claims directed to

complementary DNA (cDNA) molecules because cDNA does not occur
in nature. 335 But the Court also held patent ineligible claims directed to
the isolated form of human chromosomal (i.e., 336
naturally occurring) DNA
molecules merely because they are "isolated.,
Myriad V, like most of the few patent eligibility Supreme Court
decisions, involved claims not subjected to claim construction. 337 Again,
that is an unnerving development in § 101 jurisprudence and is
compounded by the courts' understanding (or lack thereof) of the subject
matter involved.338
The first set of claims related to isolated DNA sequences encoding
human breast cancer genes. 339 In finding those claims failed to satisfy
§ 101, the Court focused on the informational content of the isolated
DNA, reasoning that "[iut is undisputed that Myriad did not create or alter
any of the genetic information encoded in the BRCA1 and BRCA2
genes." 340 The Court found that the information contained in the isolated
DNA was not markedly different from what is found in nature. 341 As a
result, the Court could not find a difference sufficient to satisfy § 101.342
While Justice Thomas recognized that the isolated DNA is not naturally
occurring, he dismissed the distinction. 343 Instead, he reasoned that the
332. Id. See Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct. 1289, 1294
(2012); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3231 (2010).
333. SeeMyriadV, 133 S.Ct. at2111.
334. See Bilski, 130 S.Ct. at 3231 (holding the patent application patent ineligible); see also
Mayo, 132 S.Ct. at 1294 (holding the claimed processes patent ineligible).
335. Myriad V,133 S.Ct. at 2111.
336. Id.Indeed, while it upheld the cDNA claims, the Court noted that J.E.M involved a
challenge where Congress had specifically enacted legislation regarding patent protection for
plants but Congress has not endorsed the PTO's practice of awarding patents on isolated DNA.
Id. at 2118-19.
337. See, e.g., CLS Bank II, 717 F.3d 1269, 1327-28 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Linn, J., dissenting).
338. See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vacatedon
other grounds, 134 S.Ct. 2870 (2014) ("[C]laim meaning may clarify the actual subject matter at
stake in the invention and can enlighten, or even answer, questions about subject matter
abstractness.").
339. Myriad V, 133 S.Ct. at 2112-13.
340. Id. at2116.
341. Id.at2116-18.
342. Id.at2117-18.
343. Id. at 2118 (Thomas,J.,
majority opinion) ("Nor are Myriad's claims saved by the fact
that isolating DNA from the human genome severs chemical bonds and thereby creates a
nonnaturally occurring molecule. Myriad's claims are simply not expressed interms of chemical
composition[.]").
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information it coded for is the same as that of the isolated DNA.34 4
The Court distinguished the patented bacterium in Chakrabartyfrom
the isolated DNA in Myriad's patents. 345 Unlike in Chakrabarty, the
Court found that "Myriad did not create anything" worthy of patent
protection because separating a gene from its natural environment "is not
an act of invention."
The Court instead relied on Funk Bros. to find
claims to isolated DNA patent ineligible, reasoning that Myriad's claims
to naturally occurring DNA imparted the same level of insufficient
347
"inventiveness" as the mixed culture of known bacteria in Funk Bros.
Specifically, the Court characterized Myriad's principal contribution as
"uncovering the precise location and genetic sequence of the BRCA1 and
BRCA2 genes" within their natural environment. 348 The Court ultimately
determined that the effort Myriad had employed, while extensive, was
"insufficient to satisfy the demands of § 101 .
The Court also rejected the argument that it should consider the PTO's
long-standing practice of granting patents with claims covering isolated
DNA and the consequent reliance interests of those holding such
patents. 350 The Court summarized its position
by suggesting that those
351
interests were "better directed to Congress.
In holding the cDNA claims patent eligible, the Court acknowledged
differences between naturally occurring DNA and its corresponding
cDNA. 352 Because the non-coding regions of naturally occurring DNA
are absent from cDNA, the Court noted that cDNA did not qualify as a
product of nature-"creation of a cDNA sequence from mRNA results in
an exons-only molecule that is not naturally occurring"-and is,
therefore, patent eligible. 353 The Court reasoned, however, that cDNA is
only patent eligible insofar as it is different from the corresponding
chromosomal DNA, meaning short cDNA that
is the same as its
354
chromosomal counterpart is not patent eligible.
The Court noted that Myriad V was not about and does not impact
method claims. 355 As a result, composition of matter claims is subject to
scrutiny under Myriad V and Chakrabarty,while method claims are left
to Mayo and Bilski.
344.

Id.

345.

Id. at2116-17.

346.
347.
348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

Id. at 2117.
Id.
Id.at2116.
Id. at2118.
Id. at2118-19.
Id. at 2119 n.7.
Id. at2119.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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(2) Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia concurred with the Court's opinion except for the
portions discussing the art.356 Specifically, he opined that he was not able
to affirm on his "own knowledge or . . .belief' the details of the art
discussed by Justice Thomas' majority opinion. 357 As a result, he merely
affirmed that "the portion of DNA isolated from its natural state sought
to be patented is identical to that portion of the DNA in its natural state;
and that complementary DNA . . . is a synthetic creation not normally
present in nature." 358 Justice Scalia therefore agreed that the isolated
3 59
DNA claims were not patent eligible but that the cDNA claims were.
(3) Reaction
The holding and brevity of Myriad V were not surprising. Patent
eligibility determinations for composition of matter or manufacture
claims are, in practice, fairly straightforward, particularly when
compared to that same determination for method or process claims.
Moreover, the questioning during oral argument strongly suggested the
holdings.
But the Court's discussion of the art is alarming. The Court's
understanding of the art naturally stems from the opinions below and the
briefing before it. The Court is limited to that information, most of which
was provided by advocates, as well as by the time it gets to absorb it.
Relaying sufficient information regarding such complex art to form a
foundation for the Court in a cycle or two of briefing can be impractical.
Indeed, Justice Scalia acknowledged his inability to affirm the Court's
discussion of the underlying art, though he did reach the same conclusion
360
as to the patent eligibility of the claims directed to that very art.
Justice Scalia's concurrence highlights a fundamental problem with
the Supreme Court's recent patent eligibility cases. The Court can decide
the patent eligibility of claims when it does not sufficiently understand
the art. Moreover, Justice Scalia, by concurring with the holding only,
signaled that he did not need to understand the art in order to decide the
patent eligibility of the claims. Compounding this troublesome
admission, the Supreme Court is also content in deciding1 patent eligibility
36
without knowing the scope or meaning of the claims.

356.
357.
358.
359.
360.
361.

Id. at 2120 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
See supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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District Court judges can now look at this opinion and say "I do not
have to understand the science or engineering to decide that the claims
before me are patent ineligible." That problem is two-fold in cases where
the claims have not been construed. In the end, District Court judges can
read Myriad V as condoning decisions on patent eligibility without
understanding the art or the claimed invention, and that is concerning.
(4) UltramercialDoes Not Make a Happy Ending
Since the chaos of CLS Bank, a complete Federal Circuit panel-all
of whom came down in different places in CLS Bank-agreed to reverse
the District Court's ruling that the claims covered only an abstract idea
and were, therefore, patent ineligible. 362 Indeed, although the Federal
Circuit has struggled to set clear rules for determining the patent
eligibility of method claims since Mayo, Ultramercialrepresents the first
full panel to agree that the claims satisfied § 101.363 Specifically, Judge
Rader-joined by Judge O'Malley-held that the district court erred in
granting a motion to dismiss, holding that the claims failed to satisfy
§ 101.364 That said, Judge Lourie concurred in the ruling
but reached it
365
using the test he articulated in his CLS Bank opinion.
Notably, Chief Judge Rader began by acknowledging that the district
court held the claims patent ineligible without construing them in
accordance with precedent. 366 Despite reversing the court's finding also
without construing the claims, he reasoned that "it will be rare that a
patent infringement suit can be dismissed at the pleading stage for lack
of patentable [i.e., patent eligible] subject matter., 367 He continued,
noting that "the analysis under § 101, while ultimately a legal
determination, is rife with underlying factual issues. . . . and in part
because of the factual issues involved, claim construction normally will
be required., 368 More importantly, Chief Judge Rader noted that,
even if not required, on many occasions a definition of the
invention by claim construction can clarify the basic character of
the subject matter of the invention. Thus, claim meaning may
clarify the actual subject matter at stake in the invention and can
enlighten, or even answer, questions about subject matter

362.

See Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2013).

363.

See id at 1337.

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id at

1354-55 (Lourie, J., concurring).
1349.
1338.
1339.
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369

That said, under the "procedural posture" of the case, and in view of the
claims, all three judges agreed that claim construction was not necessary
to determine that the patent "'claims a particular method' . . . and, as a
process, 'falls within a category of patent-eligible subject matter."' 370
They ended by stating that "[t]he [claims] 3require
more than just [an]
71
abstract idea as part of the claimed method."
c. The Supreme Court "Decides" CLS Bank
On March 31, 2014, the Supreme Court heard oral arguments in CLS
Bank.372 During the arguments, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged the
significant confusion that the Federal Circuit and District Courts have had
after the Supreme Court's recent § 101 decisions. 373 Nonetheless, many
of the Justices seemed skeptical of the patentee's arguments, questioning
the patent claims'
validity under § 101, and hinting that the claims would
374
not hold up.
But not all of the Justices were as skeptical; Justice Scalia spoke
infrequently and seemed to accept that the patent was not invalid under
§ 101.375 Justice Scalia was careful to point out that while the claims may
satisfy § 101, they may not satisfy novelty, as required by other sections
of the patent laws. 376 And despite Justice Breyer's clear indication in oral
arguments that he did not believe the claims satisfied § 101, he expressed
concerns that the Court could go too far and exclude computer-dependent
patents entirely. 377 Justice Breyer's concern was well foundedbalancing the need to reward technological innovation while preventing
an intellectual property drain on the ever-changing computer industry has
proven to be a challenge. As the Federal Circuit's opinions show, the
Supreme Court has failed to provide sufficient guidance on this issue with
its recent interest in patent eligibility.
When the Court issued its CLSBank decision, it provided the expected

369.
370.

Id. at 1340.
Id.at 1355 (Lourie, J.,
concurring) (citing 722 F.3d at 1349-50 (majority opinion)).

371.

Id.

372. Transcript of Oral Argument, Alice Corp. Pty., Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347
(2014) (No. 13-298), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral-arguments/argument_
transcripts/ 13-298_869d.pdf.
373. Id. at42:5-10.
374. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, Alice Corp. Pty., Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l,
134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) (No. 13-298).
375. See, e.g., id.
at 9:12-16.
376.

Id. at 10:4-10.

377.

Id. at 16:14-16.
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result, holding the claim invalid under § 101.378 That said, the Court did
not substantially expand the framework set forward by its recent Bilski,
Myriad, and Mayo decisions. 379 The Court stated first that it must
determine if the claim at issue is directed toward an abstract idea.,,, If so,
then it must analyze "the elements of the claim to determine whether it
contains an 'inventive concept' sufficient to 'transform' the abstract idea
into a patent-eligible application."381 For the claim at issue, the court
passed the first step, finding that the claim was highly similar to the
hedging patent seen in Bilski.382
But when the Court addressed the more complicated second prong of
its § 101 test, the Court was forced to rely on its older software cases,
including Benson, Flook, and Diehr.38 3 First, it rejected the patentee's
argument that the use of a "physical object"--here, a computer-to
manipulate the abstract idea rendered the invention valid under § 101.384
Instead, the Court found that using the computer merely applied the
abstract idea. 385 Particularly, the Court held that the claims at issue do
nothing more than "instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea
of intermediated settlement on a generic computer." 3 6 Such an
instruction fails "to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention. 387
While the Court did not explicitly reference any of the Federal Circuit
opinion in its opinion, none of the Federal Circuit's approaches to § 101
appear sufficient. Judge Laurie's opinion treads closest-both he and the
Supreme Court require identification of any underlying abstract ideabut the Court does not require any "narrowing" of the abstract idea but a
"transformation" as seen in, for example, Benson.388 Further, the Court's
opinion did not even mention the other sections of the patent act-§§ 102,
103, and 112-for determining the validity of patent claims, much less
address the creep of § 101 into the other aspects of validity (caused by
the Court's own rulings and as identified by Judge Moore's dissent-inpart).389 In short, it seems that the Supreme Court ignored the stark
378.
379.
380.

Alice Corp. Pty., Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014).
See id.at 2354.
Id. at 2355.

381.

Id. at 2357 (quoting Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S.Ct.

1289, 1294, 1298 (2012)).
382. Id. at 2355-57.
383. Id. at 2357-59.
384. Id.at 2358-59.
385. Id.at 2358.
386. Id.at 2359.

387.
388.
part).
389.

Id.at 2360.
See CLS Bank II, 717 F.3d 1269, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Moore, J., dissenting in
See id. at 1313 (Moore, J., dissenting in part).
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confusion exemplified by the Federal Circuit's fractured reasoning, and
instead has instructed patent practitioners to look to previous Supreme
Court decisions and simply apply them.
V. ACT IV: THE END?

The U.S. patent system was founded on the principle that a limited
right to exclude is the proper incentive and exchange for the disclosure
of an invention to the public. 390 As President Abraham Lincoln reasoned:
The [patent laws] began in England in 1624; and in this country,
with the adoption of our Constitution. Before then, any man
[might] instantly use what another had invented; so that the
inventor had no special advantage from his own invention. The
patent system changed this; secured to the inventor, for a limited
time, exclusive use of his invention; and thereby added the fuel of
interest to the fire 391
of genius in the discovery and production of new
and useful things.
President Lincoln recognized that, without this critical right to exclude,
the progress of science and the useful arts would wither. 392 This has not
changed in more than two centuries.
The Supreme Court articulated the importance of this recognition in
1980:
The Constitution grants Congress broad power to legislate to
"promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The patent
laws promote this progress by offering inventors exclusive rights
for a limited period as an incentive for their inventiveness and
research efforts. The authority of Congress is exercised in the hope
that "[the] productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive
effect on society through the introduction of new products and
processes of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by
393
way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens."

390. Abraham Lincoln, Lecture: 'Discoveries, Inventions and Improvements' (1860), in 5
COMPLETE WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 1, 113 (John George Nicolay & John Hay eds., 1894).
391. Id.
392. Id.
393. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980) (quoting Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974)).
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Moreover, the Court noted that the issue before it in Chakrabartyindeed, the same question before it in each case raising § 101---"is a
narrow one of statutory interpretation requiring us to construe 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 .,,94 And the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress intended
§ 101 to be viewed expansively, even admonishing lower courts from
395
reading restrictions into patent eligibility determinations.
Unfortunately, starting with Mayo and continuing through Myriad V, the
Court recently has gone well past its own instruction, "giv[ing] staggering
breadth to what [are] meant to be ...narrow judicial exception[s]. 396
The ChakrabartyCourt also warned the judiciary that it "'should not
read into the patent laws limitations and conditions which the legislature
has not expressed.' ' 397 "Congress is free to amend § 101," to exclude or
include subject matter, as it sees fit.39 8 "But, until Congress takes such
action, [the courts] must construe the language of § 101 as it is." 399 The
current Supreme Court seems content to ignore the guidance from its
earlier incarnations.
What we suggest stems from recognizing a footnote from
Chakrabarty,where the Court plainly stated that "[t]his case does not
involve the other 'conditions and requirements' of the patent laws, such
as novelty and nonobviousness. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103.''4°° While the
current Court has read § 101 as a limitation, confusing it with §§ 102 and
103, it has done so against the guidance and reasoning of Chief Justice
Burger, citing over 100 years of law and congressional intent:
The Patent Act of 1793, authored by Thomas Jefferson, defined
statutory subject matter as "any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful
improvement [thereof]." The Act embodied Jefferson's
philosophy that ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement.
Subsequent patent statutes in 1836, 1870 and 1874 employed this
same broad language.... The Committee Reports accompanying
the 1952 Act inform us that Congress intended statutory subject
40 1
matter to include anything under the sun that is made by man.

394. Id.; see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 603 (2010).
395. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308. but see Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978)
(discussed supra Part V).
717 F.3d 1269, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (Moore, J., concurring in part
396. See CLS Bank 11,
and dissenting in part).
397. Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 308 (quoting United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289
U.S. 178, 199 (1933)).
398. Id. at318.
399. Id.
400. Id. at 307 n.5.
401. Id. at 308-09 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
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Shortly before Justice Burger wrote the text above, Judge Giles Rich had
criticized Flook for blurring the lines between (i) patent eligibility and
(ii) novelty and non-obviousness. 40 2 Indeed, by wedging unwarranted
exceptions into § 101-and eliminating patent eligibility for broad
classes of subject matter-the Court has usurped the power of the
legislature despite the fact that "Congress40 3plainly contemplated that the
patent laws would be given wide scope."
Consideration of 35 U.S.C § 101 and Chakrabarty, Bilski, and
particularly CLS Bank, shows that the Court's recent opinions not only
prove difficult to apply, 40 4 but also conflict with the statute and its own
interpretation of the Constitution. 40 5 Indeed, as Chief Justice Burger
noted,
Congress has performed its constitutional role in defining
patentable [i.e., patent eligible] subject matter in § 101; we perform
ours in construing the language Congress has employed. In so
doing, our obligation is to take statutes as we find them, guided, if
ambiguity appears, by the legislative history and statutory purpose.
Here, we perceive no ambiguity. The subject-matterprovisions of
the patent law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the
constitutionaland statutory goal of promoting "the Progress of
Science andthe useful Arts " with all that meansfor the social and
economic benefits envisionedby Jefferson. Broad general language
is not necessarily 40ambiguous
when congressional objectives
6
require broad terms.
Even the dissent in Chakrabartyexplicitly recognized this fact: "It is the
role of Congress, not this Court, to broaden or narrow the reach of the
patent laws. This is especially true where, as here, the composition sought
to be patented uniquely implicates matters of public concern. "407
402. In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 956-58 (C.C.P.A. 1979), vacatedin partsub nom. Diamond
v. Chakrabarty, 444 U.S. 1028 (1980), and affd sub nom. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303

(1980).
403.

Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 308.

404. See, e.g., Ultramercial, Inc. v. Hulu, LLC, 722 F.3d 1335, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(recognizing that "[mlembers of both the Supreme Court and [the Federal Circuit] have
recognized the difficulty of providing a precise formula or definition for the abstract concept of
abstractness."(emphasis added) (citing Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 621 (2010) (Stevens, J.,
concurring)).
405. See Chakrabarty,447 U.S. at 315 ("It is, of course, correct that Congress, not the
courts, must define the limits of patentability; but it is equally true that once Congress has spoken
it is 'the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."') (quoting Marbury
v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803)) (emphasis added).
406. Id. (emphasis added).
407. Id. at 322 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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VI. POSTLUDE

Judge Gajarsa and Dr. Cogswell were prophetic in 2006 when they
questioned whether the bar was observing "a comprehensive Supreme
Court 'reform' of this country's patent law jurisprudence. ' 408 The
substance of that reform with respect to patent eligibility is unfortunate.
Justice Stevens' 2002 warning in his dissent in Holmes Group40 9 has
proven instead to have been a flare that the Supreme Court would restrict
§ 101 contrary to the Constitutional mandate and purpose of the patent
statute, namely to allow the PTO to grant patent protection to deserving
inventors.
Another member of the patent bar recently asked: "Can the Supreme
Court Glue § 101 Back Together?" 410 Unfortunately the answer appears
to be that the Supreme Court is not interested in doing so but, instead,
seems intent on limiting patent eligibility. Doing so will strip incentives
from the global economy and crack the foundation of the United States
as an innovation leader. Indeed, the Supreme Court's most recent § 101
decisions do not justify Justice Stevens's fear in Holmes Group of leaving
patent law to a court with institutional bias, namely, an understanding of
the patent bar and its practices. 4 1 Instead, these decisions fail to provide
the Federal Circuit with clear and easily enforceable guidance. And such
institutional bias could be exactly what we need.

408.
409.
(Stevens,
410.
411.

Gajarsa & Cogswell, supra note 2, at 844.
See Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 839 (2002)
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
See Brinkerhoff, supra note 262.
See Holmes Grp., 535 U.S. at 839.
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